

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Security Committee**

Serial: PerSSub-M-006-82

18 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Standards for Access to Intelligence

STAT 1. At the 13 April 1982 meeting of the Personnel Security Subcommittee, we considered the strawman position paper prepared by [ ] of your staff, same subject, dated 5 March 1982 (copy attached). This paper had been provided to members on 9 March 1982.

2. The basic premise of subject paper is that, pursuant to Executive Order 12333, the Director of Central Intelligence has both the authority and responsibility to establish safeguards to protect foreign intelligence information, whether it be Sensitive Compartmented Information or collateral classified information. There currently exists a unified DCI program relative to personnel security to protect the former, but there is no unified DCI program relative to personnel security to protect the latter. The strawman paper recommends that the Security Committee propose such a unified DCI personnel security program to protect collateral foreign intelligence by establishing personnel security criteria for access to this information.

3. The PerSSub acknowledges the authority and responsibility vested in the Director of Central Intelligence by EO 12333 relative to this issue. However, it is the consensus of the subcommittee that existing departmental and agency clearance criteria for access to collateral classified information is sufficient to protect non-SCI foreign intelligence information. Such criteria, although not a unified DCI program, is the most practicable personnel security standard to apply as a prerequisite for access to this type of information in the absence of a new special access program designed to identify non-SCI foreign intelligence. Subcommittee members cited a 1979 Intelligence Community effort to consider the establishment of just such a special access program. It was recalled that this effort concluded that such a program was impractical and counterproductive to the decompartmentation concept designed to ensure distribution to the maximum number of those cleared individuals who need this information. To establish another set of access criteria for these persons would seemingly circumvent, at least in part, the intent of decompartmentation.

4. Consequently, the PerSSub contemplates no further deliberations on this matter within the context of the subject SECOM paper unless

Serial: PerSSub-M-006-82

directed to do so. If it is decided to pursue this issue, we recommend the following two steps be taken sequentially prior to attempting to actually write personnel security standards for access to non-SCI intelligence information:

a. The Compartmentation Subcommittee should be tasked with evaluating the efficacy of a special access program for non-DCI intelligence information and, if deemed desirable, propose the specifics of such a program with a draft DCID and implementing regulatory documents, to include cost and resource impact.

b. The PerSSub would then survey those criteria now in effect within the Intelligence Community for issuing clearances for access to nationally classified information which, of course, includes non-SCI foreign intelligence data. We would then attempt to establish the most meaningful and practicable personnel security standards for access to the proposed special access program.



Chairman  
Personnel Security Subcommittee

STAT